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This paper delves into the complex relationship between health trade through 
international fragmentation and health trade through commercial presence. A neo-classical full 
employment four sector static general equilibrium model has been developed, where the three 
sectors produce final products except the health intermediate goods producing sector. The 
paper shows that expansion of health trade through commercial presence implies, under some 
reasonable conditions, enhancement of the volume of health trade through international 
fragmentation. It also shows that the composite volume of trade in health services through 
international fragmentation and commercial presence increases the size of the health care in 
our stylised small open economy.     
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
It has been specifically pointed out in General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) that trade in health services occur through four modes. These are namely, (1) cross-
border supply: where the service is provided remotely from one country to another, such as 
telemedicine via Internet or satellite, or international health insurance policies; (2) 
consumption abroad: where individuals use a service in another country, such as patients 
travelling to take advantage of foreign health care facilities; (3) commercial presence: where a 
foreign company sets up operations within another country in order to deliver the service, 
such as hospitals, health clinics or insurance offices, and (4) presence of natural persons: 
where individuals such as doctors, nurses or midwives travel to another country to supply a 
service there on a temporary basis. In this paper we have considered only trade in health 
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services via the mode of commercial presence. The consideration of this mode of health trade 
becomes important mainly due to the massive presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
health care in the post globalisation era of any developing economy.1 However, there is dearth 
of theoretical works which have considered health trade in the context of international trade. 
In particular, there is almost no study (empirical as well as theoretical) that has considered 
health trade through international fragmentation. This issue has also not been considered in 
any one of the four modes of GATS.  
It is to be mentioned in this context that the term international fragmentation is 
widely used in  the literature on international trade. For instance, Jones and Kierzkowski 
(2005), Deardoff (2001), Jones and Marjit (2001), Marjit (2008), Marjit (2009) and 
Marjit, Beladi, and Chakraborty (2004) etc.2 have nicely defined international 
fragmentation and have discussed its various implications. The term international 
fragmentation implies that the production process is dependent on intermediate inputs 
from abroad. In India, over 65 percent of the medical equipments are still being imported 
from abroad in a very fast growing domestic market, which was 80 percent—90 percent 
in the pre liberalisation period. This implies health service sector is internationally 
fragmented. Not only for India this is also relevant for many other developing economies. 
However, neither of the modes of GATS has captured this issue in spite of its relevance 
in a globalised world. The present paper is an attempt to analyse theoretically the 
consequences of incorporating the issue of international fragmentation in the context of 
the health sector. In fact this paper is probably the first attempt to examine theoretically 
the interrelation between different patterns of health trade like commercial presence and 
international fragmentation. The present study thus not only focuses on an aspect that is 
not mentioned in any one of the modes of GATS but also tries to link mode 3 of GATS 
with international fragmentation. In other words the paper shows how mode 3 of GATS 
can be broadly interpreted to incorporate international fragmentation.   
In the literature all the authors, as mentioned earlier, have discussed either the causes 
behind the term international fragmentation or have related fragmentation with the pattern 
of trade. Unlike others, in this paper we are interested to identify FDI as a source of 
international fragmentation. This is something new in the context of the literature on 
international fragmentation. Given the fact that trade through international fragmentation is 
possible due to inflow of FDI, there is enough scope to analyse the impact of trade through 
international fragmentation, in the presence of health capital mobility, on the size of the 
 
1
Feedback ventures expect private equity funds to invest at least US$ 1 billion during 2009-2013. 12 percent 
of the US$ 77 million venture capital investments in July-September 2009 were in the healthcare sector. GE plans to 
invest over US$ 3 billion on R&D, US$ 2 billion to drive healthcare information technology and health in rural and 
underserved areas, US$ 1 billion in partnerships, content and services, over the next six years. International clinic chain 
Asklepios International plans to invest US$ 100-200 million in the Indian healthcare market. Gulf-based group Dr 
Moopen is planning to invest US$ 200 million for setting up hospitals and eye-care centres across India. Fortis is 
planning to invest US$ 55 million to expand its pan-India operations. In the recent decade the medical devices and 
equipments industry has been successful in attracting foreign direct investment too though this sector is importing 50 
percent–60 percent till now. From merely US$2.3 million in 2000 it reached US$ 147.69 million in 2009. Some of big 
foreign firms in the sector invested in India either directly or through collaborations and joint ventures. Some to 
mention are GE (USA), Isoft (Australia), Proton Healthcare (USA) and Seimens (Germany) etc.  
2
Jones and Marjit (2008) have considered a general equilibrium framework and from which they have argued 
that trade may lead to more fragmented activities relative to autarky even if one observes specialisation. Again Marjit, 
Beladi, and Chakraborty (2004) have shown that reduction in the price of intermediate product may lead to a zone 
which is more fragmented. They have also examined the impact of fragmentation on skilled-unskilled wage gap.  
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health care. This is consistent with GATS view that commercial presence (inflow of FDI) is 
a major source of health trade for any developing economy. Moreover, this issue becomes  
more relevant for the policy-makers in the context of mobile health capital regime.  
In this paper we have tried to examine the impact of trade in health services via 
commercial presence and international fragmentation on the output levels of a health care 
of a small open developing economy. Moreover,  we have found  in our study that finite 
changes  in trade policy through commercial presence in a health care may enhance the 
volume of health trade  due to international fragmentation. It also shows that the 
composite volume of trade in health services through international fragmentation and 
commercial presence increases the size of the health care in our small open economy. 
The paper is organised in the following manner. Section 2 considers the model. It 
has one subsection. Subsection 2.1 considers the drive towards fragmentation and health 
sector. Finally, the concluding remarks are made in Section 3.   
 
2.  MODEL 
We consider a small open economy consisting of four sectors in a Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson framework. Out of the four sectors, one is an export sector (A), which produces an 
exportable composite good (XA) (other than health) using unskilled labour (L) and capital (K). 
The second sector is an import competing sector (M), which produces importable good (XM)  
using skilled labour (S) and capital. The third and fourth sectors of our economy are the 
domestic intermediate health good producing sector (I) and the health sector (H) respectively. 
Sector I uses skilled labour along with health capital (N) for production of the intermediate 
health product (XI) of our economy and the health sector uses health capital,
3 skilled labour 
and intermediate health input (XI) to produce another exportable product (XH). Here we 
assume that the requirement of intermediate goods for the production of one unit of output of 
the health sector is fixed. Competitive markets, CRS technology, diminishing marginal 
productivity and full employment of factors of production are also assumed.  
The notations used in the model are stated as follows: 
 Xi = product produced by the ith sector,  
 i = A, M, I, H;  
 PfA = world price of commodity A;  
 PA = domestic price of commodity XA, we assume  
 PA = P
f
A = 1;  
 PM = world price of good XM;  
 PI = domestically determined price of XI;  
 PfI = price of the foreign intermediate commodity;  
 PH = world price of XH;  
 aji = quantity of the jth factor for producing one unit of output in the ith sector, 
j=L,K,S,N and i=A,M,I,H;  
 W = competitive unskilled wage rate;  
 WS = skilled wage rate;  
 
3
By the term health intermediate goods we actually mean those commodities which are exhausted  in the 
course of production in the health service sector (H), e.g. injectable goods and its associated products, several 
chemicals, equipments used in pathology and different forms of medicines. Again by health capital we mean those 
equipments and products which are not exhausted  in the production process, e.g. ECG machine, X-ray machine etc.   
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 r = rate of return to capital;  
 R = rate of return to health capital;  
 
 = nutritional efficiency of unskilled labour and 0/  ;  
 
 = nutritional efficiency of skilled labour and 0/  ;  
 ^ = proportional change, d = domestic and f = foreign. 
The  structure of equations of the model is as follows.    
The competitive equilibrium conditions in the product market for the four sectors 
give us the following equations.        
aLAW +aKAr =1 … … … … … … … (1) 
aSMWS + aKMr = PM  … … … … … … (2) 
aSIWS + aNIR = PI  … … … … … … … (3) 
aSH  
f
SW + aNHR + aIH PI = PH … … … … … (4) 
For simplicity we assume that aSH and aIH are given to us and we have also 
assumed that WfS >WS. 
Equilibrium condition for the health intermediate sector is given by 
aIH XH = XI = XI
d + XI
f  … … … … … … (5) 
Sector specificity of unskilled labour is given by the following equation  
aLAXA = L )( HX  … … … … … … … (6) 
Perfect mobility of capital between sectors A and M can be expressed as   
aKAXA + aKMXM = K
d+ Kf =K … … … … … (7)  
Full employment of skilled labour implies the following equation 
aSMXM + aSIXI + aSHXH = S )( HX   … … … … … (8) 
Perfect mobility of health capital between sectors H and I can be expressed as 
aNHXH + aNIXI  = N
d+ Nf = N … … … … … (9)  
This completes the specification of our model. We have nine unknown variables— 
W, WS, r, R, PI, XA, XM, XI, and XH —that are solved by nine Equations, (1)–(9), for the 
given parameters, PA, PM, PH, L, K, S and N.  
Here we are eager to find out the cause and implications of international fragmentation 
(IF) in the presence of a health care. In this model sector I has been considered as a domestic 
intermediate health good producing sector. This intermediate good can be imported by the 
health sector from foreign but in this case it has to incur an intermediate cost () mainly due 
to transaction or communication factors.4 Thus whether the health service sector is going with 
IF or no IF, that depends upon the following conditions,  
 
4
Interested readers may look at Marjit, Beladi, and Chakraborty (2004) for the definition of 
international fragmentation that we have used in this paper. The RHS of both (10.1) and (10.2) are implying the 
gap between cost of domestic intermediate health service provider at WS
f
, R f and cost of domestic intermediate 
health service provider at WS, R. Now IF is preferable if this gap is greater than the fixed cost associated with 
import of intermediate health services and IF is not preferable if this gap is less than the fixed cost associated 
with import of intermediate health services. For details one can go through the above mentioned paper.  
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 (i) IF is preferable if (WS
f – WS)aSI + (R
f – R) aNI  > )(N , … … (10.1) 
(ii) IF is not preferable if (WS
f – WS)aSI + (R
f – R) aNI < )(N  … … (10.2)  
So far we have considered that internationally health capital is immobile and hence 
N has been treated as exogenous.  Now we want to take into account the case of 
international health capital mobility, implying N is to be treated as an endogenous 
variable. This is very crucial in the context of the present paper. In most of the studies 
related to fragmentation the authors have considered the change in the gap between price 
of domestic intermediate and price of foreign intermediate as main cause of trade through 
IF, whereas in this paper we want to show that mobility of  health capital causes trade 
through IF.  In the regime of international health capital mobility the equation structure 
remains similar to that of earlier. The only change that we have to note is that N becomes 
endogenous and R is fixed at Rf. Thus the number of unknowns and number of 
independent equations remain same and hence the system can be solved.  
Let us start with a movement from regime of international health capital 
immobility to regime of international health capital mobility and hence R will go down.  
From Equation (4) we can say that a fall in R leads to an increase in PI, since PH and W
f
S 
are exogenously given. By using similar type of arguments from Equations (1), (2) and 
(3) we can infer that finite increase of N causes rise in W, WS and fall in r.
5  Thus above 
mentioned inequalities can be rewritten as 
(i) )()( NN  , … … … … … … (10.1) 
(ii) )()( NN   … … … … … … (10.1) 
The above analysis can be explained with the help of Figure 1.6  
Fig. 1. 
 
 ,   
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                                                                                                      E2                       
)(N  )(N  
            O              N0      N1                                      N2            N                          
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
See Appendix 2 for details. 
6
Shapes of  and  schedule have been explained in Appendix 1. 
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In this paper we find that there exist two critical values of N such that for all 
N ],[ 21 NN  there will be IF. Here N
2 is the international health capital market clearing 
level of health capital. It is to be noted for N[0, ]1N  there will be no fragmentation. 
Actually by using this interval we want to explain the initial stage of economic growth of 
any developing economy, since here we assume Nf is zero up to N0. As we move towards 
N1 it implies the economy needs more of N, it also implies the need for foreign 
intermediate health product. At N1 (point E1) we can arrive at a situation, where health 
service sector will be indifferent between IF and no IF. Hence to fill up the demand for 
health care, sector H has to import more foreign health intermediate products. Thus it is 
clear from the above figure that  movement from lower level of N (say N1) to a higher 
level of it (say towards N2) causes further increase in IF in health care. Here point N2 
(point E2) implies a threshold level of health capital where we will reach again to a 
situation where sector H will be indifferent between IF and no IF. The only difference 
between E1 and E2 is that, at E1 the economy  has low level of health capital resulting in 
IF, whereas at E2 the economy  has very high level of health capital implying that sector 
H has made its own infrastructure for intermediate health product. It implies after E2 the 
economy will be indifferent between IF and no IF.       
We state the results in the form of following proposition. 
Proposition 1: If ],[0)]()([ 21 NNforNNN  , trade  due to international 
fragmentation in health service sector will rise through trade 
liberalisation  and foreign health capital mobility. 
 
2.1.  The Drive towards Fragmentation and the Health Sector 
An increase in N implies a fall in R. To examine the impact of an increase in N on 
XH, we are modifying the Equation (9) as follows. Using Equation (5) in Equation (9) we 
get  
(aNH + aNI aIH) XH = N … … … … … … (9.1) 
From Equation (9.1) we can argue that a reduction in R implies an increase in unit 
health capital demand of sectors H and I. Again a rise in N causes a rise in supply of 
health capital. Thus XH will go up if change in supply of health capital dominates  the 
change in demand for health capital. This is usual in case of a small open developing 
economy, because purchasing power of consumers of health capital in these economies  
is very low. From Equation (5) we can infer that an expansion of health care leads to an 
increase in XI
f. From Equation (6) we can say that a rise in XH causes an increase in XA 
due to both—Nutritional Efficiency Effect (NEE) and Factor Price Effect (FPE). A fall in 
R will lead to a reduction in per unit labour demand in sector A. Thus from Equation (6) 
we can infer that, given nutritional efficiency factor, a movement towards health capital 
mobility will enhance the output level of sector A. We call it FPE. Again a rise in XH 
implies a rise in nutritional efficiency of labour and hence it will cause an expansion of 
sector A. We call it NEE. Using these arguments from Equation (8) one can observe that 
there is another rise in XH. The first rise in XH as already mentioned, is mainly due to 
infrastructure developmental aspect of health capital mobility. However, the second rise 
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in XH is due to two different aspects, first, because of nutritional efficiency aspect of 
health capital mobility on both types of labour  and second because of the impact of 
international fragmentation. Regarding the first effect it is to be noted that an increase in 
XH due to a rise in N leads to an increase in (XH) 
and (XH). From Equations (6) and (7) 
we can argue that a rise in L )( HX leads to an expansion of sector A and a contraction 
of sector M. A fall in XM implies sector M releases some amount of skilled labour on one 
hand and on the other hand a rise in S )( HX , due to rise in XH, implies productivity of 
skilled labour will go up. Thus combining these nutritional efficiency  effects one can say 
that sector H will definitely improve. Regarding the second effect we find that an 
increase in XH due to rise in N leads to fall in XI
d and rise in XI
f. This is mainly due to the 
presence of international fragmentation. Thus contraction of domestic health intermediate 
goods producing sector implies  availability of S and N to sector H will increase and 
hence output levels of health care will go up.    
Proposition 2: A movement from a regime of no fragmentation towards a regime of 
fragmentation (or towards a regime of international health capital 
mobility) leads to an increase in the levels of output of health care and a 
reduction in the level of output of the domestic intermediate health goods 
producing sector. 
 
 
3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present paper considers a four sector general equilibrium structure where the 
third and fourth sectors are intermediate health goods producing sector and health service 
sector respectively. In this model we have captured the positive production externality of 
health service sector  for both types of labour through nutritional efficiency factors. In 
such a setup we have shown that a movement towards health capital mobility may 
increase the possibilities of health trade through international fragmentation. Thus policy 
makers can use the mobility of health capital as an instrument for controlling the volume 
of health trade through international fragmentation. Apart from this here we have 
examined the impact of trade liberalisation in the form of regime change on the output 
levels of different sectors, in the presence of a private health care. In this part we have 
shown that a change in regime from international health capital immobility to 
international health capital mobility, leads to an expansion of health service sector and 
hence it increases the demand of imported health intermediate product. Thus an 
improvement of health trade through commercial presence may uplift trade of health 
services  due to international fragmentation. 
 
Appendices 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
1.  Shape of )(N Schedule 
Initially we have assumed a very high and fixed intermediate cost for N[0, N0], 
it implies )(N schedule is horizontal up to foreign health capital immobility. As we 
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have entered into the region of health capital mobility it implies the cost related to 
transaction and communication factors will decline because technology will be 
transferred from north to south and medium of communications and transactions will 
become more cheap compared to the situation of no health capital mobility. Thus it will 
be downward sloping for N[N0, N2] . Cost related to communication and transaction 
factors are declining is a fact but it will decline up to N2 and after that )(N schedule 
will become horizontal, as  will be fixed at its minimum value. 
 
2.  Shape of )(N Schedule 
Since R is fixed in the region of health capital immobility, it implies the left 
hand side of inequality (10.1) will also remain fixed and hence (N) becomes 
horizontal for N[0, N0]. As we move towards health capital mobility, we may have 
different situations and that will affect the shape of (N) schedule. If initially we 
assume that fall in R dominates  the increase in WS and (N) becomes upward rising 
and after a large amount of inflow of foreign health capital, the (N)
 
becomes 
downward sloping due to the assumption that an increase in WS dominates  the decline 
in R. Thus (N) schedule will be of inverted U shape for N[N0, N2]. After N2 it will 
be horizontal as R is fixed at Rf.         
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
APPENDIX 2 
Here we consider the following, 
 θji  = distributive share of the jth input in the ith sector and  
 σi  = elasticity of factor substitution in sector i, i = A, M, I, H. 
Differentiation of equation (4) gives us 
NH Rˆ + NH NHaˆ + IH IPˆ = 0 
Now  H  = ( NHaˆ - IHaˆ / IPˆ - Rˆ ) 
NHaˆ = ( IPˆ - Rˆ )H   
Using it we get 
NH (1- H) Rˆ + ( NH H + IH ) IPˆ = 0 
Rˆ = - (A2/A1) IPˆ   … … … … … … … (A.1) 
Where, A1, A2 > 0.  
Differentiation of Equation (3) gives us, 
aSI dWS + WS daSI + aNI dR + R daNI = dPI 
From the envelop condition we get 
WS daSI + R daNI = 0 
Using envelop condition we get 
SI SWˆ  + NI Rˆ = IPˆ  
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Using (A.1) we get 
SWˆ = {(1/ SI ) + ( NI / SI )(A2/A1)} IPˆ  
SWˆ = A3 IPˆ   … … … … … … … (A.2) 
Where, A3 > 0. 
Differentiating Equation (2) we get 
rˆ = - ( SM / KM ) SWˆ   … … … … … … (A.3) 
Similarly from Equation (1) one obtains 
Wˆ = - ( KA / LA ) rˆ   … … … … … … (A.4) 
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